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Abstract
The purposes of the following thesis is to research United States Supreme Court sexdiscrimination jurisprudence and ascertain if Fourteenth Amendment legislative history was
used, referred to, cited to, or quoted from, by the Supreme Court Justices in their opinions
regarding sex-discrimination cases since the Amendment was ratified in 1868. Legislative
history is a window into the drafting, debating, and intricate crafting of laws and amendments.
When words and phrases that are used in the statutes, codes, and amendments are ambiguous or
unclear, judges and justices should use the legislative history to ascertain the intent of the
framers of the legislation.
The methodology that was employed for this thesis was through the researching of all
relevant United States Supreme Court cases as to what was written by the Justices in their
opinions. Research was conducted into the relevant law review articles on the subject of
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme Court sex-discrimination
jurisprudence, and the historical impact of Court decisions on the law relative to sexdiscrimination. After extensive research, it was discovered that the United States Supreme Court
has established over 144 years’ worth of sex-discrimination jurisprudence. The law review
article research revealed that the lack of legislative history research by the Court has not gone
unnoticed by the legal community or the women’s rights community since the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally drafted. The research and analysis of the sources of sexdiscrimination from cases, law review articles, and books on the subject, led to the conclusion
that no Fourteenth Amendment legislative history was ever used by the Supreme Court of the
United States as part of its development of sex-discrimination jurisprudence.
ii

Dedication

For my wonderful family and my loving wife,
who all have encouraged me throughout this endeavor,
to keep working hard and strive to do my very best.

For all the professors and instructors,
whose sacrifice in pursuing a career in education
has made a difference in my life and the lives of many others.
We stand on your shoulders.
Thank you one and all.

iii

Acknowledgement
I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank the members of my Honors Thesis
Committee, Dr. Abby Milon and Dr. Roger Handberg, who have sacrificed their time and effort
to make this project possible. I would like to give special thanks to my Thesis Chair, Dr. David
Slaughter, whose enthusiasm and encouragement made the difference in my success with this
project. Dr. David Slaughter’s dedication to guide me through this process has been invaluable
and has made this project an overall enjoyable and rewarding experience.

I would also like to thank all of the faculty and staff of the University of Central Florida
Department of Legal Studies who have made my experience at the university memorable.
I will truly miss all of you.

iv

Table of Contents
+
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Early Jurisprudence: From the Drafting and Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to just
before the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed ...................................................................... 4
Established Supreme Court Jurisprudence calls for the use of Legislative History ................ 4
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873) ....................................................................................................... 9
Early Indications: The Fourteenth Amendment and its Potential Impacts ............................ 12
Minor v. Happersett (1875) ................................................................................................... 13
Muller v. Oregon (1908) ........................................................................................................ 16
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) .................................................................................... 17
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) ................................................................................ 19
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) ..................................................................................................... 22
Hoyt v. Florida (1961) ........................................................................................................... 24
Cases decided during the Chief Justice Warren Burger Court ..................................................... 28
Burger Court Cases from 1971 – 1980...................................................................................... 28
Reed v. Reed (1971) ............................................................................................................... 28
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) ............................................................................................. 29
Kahn v. Shevin (1974) ........................................................................................................... 33
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) ...................................................................................................... 35
Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) .................................................................................................... 37
Stanton v. Stanton (1975) ...................................................................................................... 39
Craig v. Boren (1976) ............................................................................................................ 40
Orr v. Orr (1979) ................................................................................................................... 42
Parham v. Hughes (1979) ...................................................................................................... 44
Caban v. Mohammed (1979) ................................................................................................. 45
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979) ............................................... 46
Califano v. Westcott (1979) ................................................................................................... 48
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company (1980).................................................... 50
v

Burger Court Cases from 1981 – 1986...................................................................................... 52
Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County (1981) .......................................................... 52
Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981) ................................................................................................ 53
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982).............................................................. 54
Cases decided during the Chief Justice William Rehnquist Court ............................................... 57
Rehnquist Court Cases from 1986 – 1996 ................................................................................ 57
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) .................................................................................... 57
United States v. Virginia (1996) ............................................................................................ 61
Legislative History: Justice Breyer and Inquiries into Congressional Intent ........................ 63
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 65
References ..................................................................................................................................... 68

vi

Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was finally ratified by
three-fourths of the States in the Union by July 9, 1868. But the real work by the duly elected
legislators was done between 1865 and 1867. The Amendment’s Framers worked in committees,
party caucuses, and finally in the main chambers of the Congress to draft and complete this
important addition to the supreme law of the land. The congressional members of the committees
charged with crafting the language for the Amendment debated long and hard regarding what
words should, could, and needed to be used, and the intentions behind them. The record of these
debates ended up as legislative history.
When a statute, code, or Amendment contains language that is unclear, or purposefully
ambiguous to allow for expansion through future interpretation, courts are supposed to use the
legislative history of a Constitutional Amendment or statute when developing its interpretation if
the intentions of the Amendment or statute are not clear.1 When the text of a statute or other
legislation is ambiguous, as in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, “the interpreter charged
with determining the meaning of the ambiguous legal text must necessarily resort to sources
outside the text itself.”2
Sex-discrimination jurisprudence established by the United States Supreme Court in the
decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is not well-grounded in the
legislative history from the Amendment. If the legislative history had been used by the Supreme

1

See John Choon Yoo, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J.
1607, 1607-08 (1991-1992).
2
Michael F. Roessler, Mistaking Doubts and Qualms for Constitutional Law: Against the Rejection of Legislative
History as a Tool of Legal Interpretation, 39 Sw.L.Rev. 103, 146 (2009).

1

Court when interpreting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would have shown the
documented discussions of “the legislators that considered, debated, and adopted ambiguousphrased texts [that outlined the] lengthy, nuanced discussions of just what [the Congress] was …
doing when the law being interpreted by the judiciary was enacted or ratified.”3
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution used terms
and language that were purposefully ambiguous, which caused “argu[ments] and debate[s]”
between Congressional members regarding “the Amendment’s meaning in the years immediately
following its ratification.”4 Those documented historical debates and discussions between
members of Congress helped establish “the idea that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not limited by the text of the Amendment,” but has an established “open-endedness” meant to
act as a “guide [to] its interpretation and application.”5 Principle players involved in the framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment spent years after its ratification reinforcing the concept that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ambiguous language extended the protection of fundamental rights for
all citizens from not only the national government but also all the state governments.6
Without the use of the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
guidance the Framers intentions would have implied, early Supreme Court sex-discrimination
cases looked to draw parallel analysis to cases that changed public policy related to race issues.
Ultimately, this thesis will argue that since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has not used legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment to assist in the process of interpreting and applying the principles intended by the
3

Roessler, supra note 2, at 146.
Id. at 141.
5
Id.
6
See generally Id.
4
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Framers of the Amendment to the sex-discrimination cases that have been heard before it
throughout the past 144 years of Supreme Court history.

3

Early Jurisprudence: From the Drafting and Ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment to just before the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed.7
Established Supreme Court Jurisprudence calls for the use of Legislative History.
According to well established United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court must look
to the legislative history of a Constitutional Amendment or statute when developing its
interpretation if the intentions of the Amendment or statute are not clear. 8 Supreme Court
Justices have relied on a “rich tradition of sources” to “guide and constrain interpretation” of the
Constitution, “including pre- and post-enactment history.”9
In his 1999 article published in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, Michael H. Koby
stated that “[o]ne of the least controversial uses of legislative history” is when the courts
“examine the intent of the drafters” of legislation in the process of “avoid[ing] an absurd
[judicial] result.”10 Koby asserts that when, as in the Fourteenth Amendment, the text is
ambiguous, “the interpreter charged with determining the meaning of the ambiguous legal text
must necessarily resort to sources outside the text itself.”11 Koby continues his commentary by
stating that,
[O]ut of deference to the legislature and legislators that consider and adopt legal
text pursuant to Article I or in deference to the national and state legislators that
propose and ratify constitutional amendments, legislative history may also
sometimes be determined to be a reliable tool of interpretation, as the legislators
that considered, debated, and adopted ambiguous-phrased texts may have engaged

7

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Yoo, supra note 1, at 1607-08.
9
Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 11-24, (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2009).
10
Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s
Critique, 36 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 369, 375 (1999).
11
Roessler, supra note 2, at 145-146.
8
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in lengthy, nuanced discussions of just what it was they were doing when the law
being interpreted by the judiciary was enacted or ratified.12
Koby went on to include quotes from Abner Mikva, a judge and former member of
Congress, stating that “the language of a statute may admittedly be vague, and therefore judges
construing the enacted statute “‘cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools [such as legislative
history] which members of Congress use to explain’” the process of legislative development and
“’describe the meaning of the words used’” in the legislation.13 The language used by the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment must have been crafted to allow there to be a flexible
understanding of its intent. “[T]he broader and more ambiguous language of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” writes Serena J. Hoy in her year 2000 article, “would seem to lend itself to more
liberal interpretation.”14 The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution used terms and language that were purposefully ambiguous, which caused
“argu[ments] and debate[s]” between Congressional members regarding “the Amendment’s
meaning in the years immediately following its ratification.”15 Those documented historical
debates and discussions between members of Congress helped establish “the idea that the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by the text of the Amendment,” but has an
established “open-endedness” meant to act as a “guide [to] its interpretation and application.”16
As part of a post-ratification debate in the Forty-Second Congress of the United States,
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio supported his position that the Fourteenth Amendment,

12

Id. at 146.
Koby, supra note 10.
14
Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & POLITICS
381, 462 (2000).
15
Roessler, supra note 2, at 141.
16
Id.
13
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which his involvement in its drafting played a “key role,” made “the first eight Amendments” or
“the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.”17
Rep. Bingham said:
Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first
section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood,
permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a state, are chiefly defined in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.18
As the excerpt above shows, even the principal players involved in the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment spent years after its ratification reinforcing the concept that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ambiguous language extended the protection of fundamental rights for
all citizens from not only the national government but also all the state governments. 19 In reality
however, the United States Supreme Court has been willing to only selectively incorporate
pieces and parts of the Bill of Rights, and not in its entirety, to apply to the States over the last
144 years since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823),20 United States Supreme Court Associate
Justice Bushrod Washington was sitting as a Federal Circuit Court judge.21 In his opinion in the
case, Justice Washington opined a sweeping description of the rights incorporated in Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution; containing the language regarding the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.22 Justice Washington used the case as an opportunity
to refer to the definitional concepts of the fundamental rights encompassed in the privileges and

17

Id.
Id.
19
See Id.
20
See generally Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823)
21
See Roessler, supra note 2, at 130-32.
22
See Id.
18
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immunities clause of the Constitution.23 Justice Washington asked “what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States?”24 His answer was, they “are, in their nature
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free Governments.” 25 Justice
Washington explained that to list the all-encompassing “fundamental principles” in the privileges
and immunities “would be perhaps more tedious than difficult to enumerate.”26 Justice
Washington’s personal attempt to list the fundamental rights included the “protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”27 He wrote that these are “mentioned
as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens . . . and the enjoyment of them by
the citizens of each State, in every other State, was manifestly calculated.”28
Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, Senator Arthur I. Boreman of West Virginia,
and Representative George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, all said in post-ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment debates that Justice Washington’s “descriptions of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship protected by Article IV also describe the scope of such privileges or
immunities in the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Representative James Monroe, a member of the
Forty-Second Congress, explained that the Constitution’s interpretation, including the
Fourteenth Amendment, should not be limited to those perceptions as they existed in the late
1800’s.30

23

See Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 131.
30
Id. at 136-137.
24

7

Representative Monroe said,
[I]n time, new circumstances will arise, new social conditions appear, and minds
will then be found who will propose to include the new phenomena under the old
rule. This will startle many as an innovation, as a violation of the constitution,
whereas it may only be the application of known and admitted principles to new
circumstances. From the nature of things the field to which constitutional law may
be applied will constantly change or be enlarged, and we must not confound this
natural expansion with a violation of the instrument itself.31
These documented assertions found in the legislative history, made by Congressional
lawmakers regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, requested that future legislators and jurists
look at the Constitution as a pronouncement of fundamental rights whose list was expansive and
expandable. Those requests, and the legislative history that proves them, were not referred to by
the Justices of the Supreme Court in their decisions as the decades have gone by since the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
“[F]ormer Representative John M. Broomall,” a framer of the Fourteenth Amendment,
“assumed [] that equality in civil rights was guaranteed to women by the Amendment.” 32 When
Mr. Broomall was “[a]t the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872–1873,” he
expressed his beliefs regarding the rights of women when he said,
Four hundred years ago women, according to the popular notion of that day, had
no souls … Still later than that, the women were beasts of burden … Still the
world moves, and in our time they have been granted equal civil rights with men.
The next step is coming, and there are those living who will see it … That step is
equality of all human beings both before the law and in the making of the law.
Thus it is that the world moves, and the man who is not prepared to keep
pace with its motion had better get out of the way.33

31

Id. at 137.
Steven G. Calabresi & Juli T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 56 (2011).
33
Id. at 56-57.
32
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Representatives James Monroe and John M. Broomall, and many other Fourteenth
Amendment framers like them, it appears, “believed that equal political rights would make
women the complete equals of men under the law.”34 And that “[e]qual political rights would
necessarily mean equal civil rights.”35 But the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Section 1 is premised
on the idea that all citizens enjoy equal civil rights which it calls ‘privileges’ or ‘immunities.’”36
“The Fifteenth Amendment establishe[d] that a subset of citizens with equal civil rights,” which
were white and African-American men, “enjoy[ed] equal political rights like the right to vote in
addition to equal civil rights.”37 With this concept in mind, it stands to reason that “[p]olitical
rights are … harder to get than civil rights.”38
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873).39 Post-ratification Fourteenth Amendment United States
Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence began in 1873 with the Court decision in
Bradwell v. Illinois. Myra Bradwell brought her case as a “challenge [to] an Illinois law that
prohibited women from practicing law.”40 Ms. Bradwell’s attorney presented the question to the
Court; “’Can a female citizen, duly qualified in respect of age, character, and learning, claim,
under the fourteenth amendment, the privilege of earning a livelihood by practicing at the bar of
a judicial court?’”41 In the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Miller stated,
In regard to [The Fourteenth] [A]mendment[,] counsel for the plaintiff… says that
there are certain privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United
States… , and he proceeds to argue that admission to the bar of a State of a person
34

Id. at 57.
Id.
36
Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas P. Stabile, Symposium: The Second Founding: On Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1431, 1443-1444 (2009).
37
Id. at 1444. [emphasis added]
38
Id. at 1443-1444.
39
Bradwell v. The State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
40
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.
41
Id.
35
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who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those which a State
may not deny. In this latter proposition we are not able to concur with counsel.42
Ms. Bradwell’s attorney argued that even though “[t]he legislature may say at what age
candidates shall be admitted [to the bar]” and may also “elevate or depress the standard of
learning required” for a license to practice law, “a qualification, to which a whole class of
citizens never can attain, is not a regulation of admission to the bar, but is, as to such citizens, a
prohibition.”43 Counsel for Bradwell went on to say,
If the [Illinois] legislature may, under the preten[s]e of fixing qualifications,
declare that no female citizen shall be permitted to practice law, it may as well
declare that no colored citizen shall practice law; for the provision in the
Constitution of the United States which secures to colored male citizens the
privileges of admission to the bar, or the pursuit of the other ordinary avocations
of life, is the provision that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen.’”44
As powerful as those words may have been, they did not sway the Court. Justice Miller
responded to Bradwell’s attorney directly in the Court’s opinion by stating, “[w]e agree with him
that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, in that relation
and character, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the
right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them.”45 The Court did stop
short of “reasoning that women were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”46 Although
the brief opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Miller, the revealing language that
expressed what this author believes was the true sentiment of the Court is contained in the
concurring opinion delivered by Justice Bradley.
42

Bradwell, supra note 39, at 138-39.
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.
44
Id.
45
Bradwell, supra note 39, at 139.
46
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.
43
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Associate Justice Bradley began his concurring opinion by acknowledging the fact that
Myra Bradwell was “a married woman.”47 Justice Bradley continued his analysis by stating that
Ms. Bradwell’s claim “assumes” that “women as citizens” have the right “under the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution … to engage in any and every profession, occupation, or
employment in civil life.”48 Justice Bradley states that the “natural and proper timidity and
delicacy” of women makes them unfit “for many of the occupations of civil life.” 49 This author
believes if Susan B. Anthony would have had the opportunity, she would have delivered quite a
strong contrary rebuttal to Justice Bradley’s remarks regarding women’s overall fitness for civil
life.
As the concurring opinion continued, Justice Bradley stated it was the “constitution of the
family” and the “harmony” which was “founded in [its] divine ordinance” that would be
“repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.”50 But it was a common law incapacity for a married woman to make contracts
“without her husband’s consent” that Justice Bradley used to fundamentally justify why women
could not “perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counselor.”51
Justice Bradley concluded his opinion by reasoning that it is “[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman [] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator.”52 It is not clear from Justice Bradley’s dicta if he felt that the “law of the Creator” 53

47

Bradwell, supra note 39, at 140.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 141.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
48
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trumped the Supreme law of the land. Additionally, nowhere in the opinion offered by the Court
is there any reference to the legislative history of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the Supreme Court Historical Society web site, the Justices that were sitting
on the bench of the Supreme Court for the 1872 – 1873 session to hear Bradwell v. Illinois were
all born between 1803 and 1816.54 Specifically, Justices Clifford (1803), Swayne (1804), and
Strong (1808), were all born when Thomas Jefferson was President.55 Remarkably, these Justices
were born only a few short years after President George Washington’s death in 1799.56 Justice
Clifford was born a mere 27 years after independence was declared from England in 1776. The
remaining Justices on the Court were all born within the presidency of James Madison, another
colonial Founding Father. The significance this author is attempting to allude to is the fact that
the era in which these Justices were reared was squarely in the shadow of the Founding Fathers
of the United States of America; a group that had come to power through the writing of the
Declaration of Independence in the generation before the sitting Supreme Court of 1873. There
can be no doubt that their Colonial-American upbringing played an integral role in the Justices’
mindset when they were establishing the earliest Supreme Court sex-discrimination doctrine.
Unfortunately for Ms. Bradwell, and the rest of America’s women, the Supreme Court Justices,
raised by colonial fathers from the Eighteenth Century, could not see into the future where the
year 1900 A.D. and the Twentieth Century lie only a scant 26 years ahead.
Early Indications: The Fourteenth Amendment and its Potential Impacts. In the days
and months leading up to the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, bits and pieces
54

See "The Supreme Court Historical Society - Home." N.p., n.d. Web. 09 July 2012. Found at
http://www.supremecourthistory.org
55
See Id.
56
See "George Washington." The White House. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 July 2012. Found at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewashington
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of the Amendment were circulated through media outlets of the time, like newspapers and other
periodical publications. These releases gave the post-Civil War citizenry a glimpse at what
would become the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the full document was ratified, women’s
groups, like the National Woman’s Suffrage Association, began to “claim the right to vote”
based on the belief that the “new constitutional amendment” entitled women to vote “under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”57 The National Woman’s Suffrage Association (NWSA)
leadership headed by the now legendary Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
“petitioned Congress for a Section Five statute declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected women’s right to vote.”58 At the same time that NWSA leadership was working on the
United States Congress for legislative action regarding women’s enfranchisement into the
political system, “women across the nation engaged in civil-disobedience voting” in an effort to
“produce test-case constitutional litigation.”59 This strategy ultimately led to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Minor v. Happersett in 1875.60
Minor v. Happersett (1875).61 It had been “[t]wo years [][since] the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Bradwell” when the Court, in Minor v. Happersett, ruled on “whether women ha[d]
the right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.”62 Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion
for the Supreme Court in Happersett.63 In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Waite chose to first

57

Reva B. Siegel, Social Movements and Law Reform: Text in Contest: Gender and The Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 334-335 (2001).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 335.
60
Id.
61
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
62
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.
63
Happersett, 88 U.S. at 162.
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address whether “women have always been considered as citizens the same as men.”64 Chief
Justice Waite wrote that the “abundant proof” as to women’s citizenry “is to be found in the
legislative and judicial history of the country.”

65

The Court’s opinion stated that Mrs. Minor

“has always been a citizen [of the United States] from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of citizenship.”66
Attorneys for Mrs. Virginia Minor “argued the restrictions on women’s suffrage violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause[]”67 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Waite wrote in
the Court’s Happersett opinion that if suffrage was a “privilege[] of a citizen of the United
States[,]” set out in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, then “[t]he direct
question is, therefore, presented whether all citizens are necessarily voters.” 68 Chief Justice
Waite stated that “[t]he Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens.”69
He wrote that to find “that definition we must look elsewhere[,]” but “[i]n this case we need not
determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them.”70
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Waite stated that “the Constitution has not added
the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizen[,] … [i]t simply furnished an
additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had.”71 From that point in the
opinion, Chief Justice Waite embarked on a lengthy discussion and testimonial of the history of

64

Id. at 169.
Id.
66
Id. at 170.
67
Samantha Barbas, Symposium on Gender, Parenting, and the Law: Note: Dorothy Kenyon and the Making of
Modern Legal Feminism, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 423, 434 (2009).
68
Happersett, 88 U.S. at 170.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 171. [emphasis added]
65
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voter laws established in the original colonies of the United States. 72 Justice Waite stated in the
Court’s opinion that they were then seeking to ascertain the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution as it related to whether or not they “intended to make all citizens of the United
States voters.”73 Justice Waite stated “if it had been intended to make all citizens of the United
States voters, the framers of the Constitution would [] have … [made it] expressly declared.”74
Even though Chief Justice Waite acknowledged in the Court’s opinion that the Court
researched the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution through
“legislative and judicial history,”75 and how they “must look elsewhere”76 for the defined
privileges and immunities, and that considerations “outside [the Constitution] is equally
effective[,]”77 an analysis of the legislative history of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment
is conspicuously missing.
Ultimately, “the Court in Minor v. Happersett did not deny that women’s civil rights were
equally protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” but ruled that the Constitution did not
guarantee any citizens’ “right to vote because the Amendment protected only civil and not
political rights.”78 In reaction to the Happersett ruling, the National Woman’s Suffrage
Association (NWSA) “began to pursue a constitutional amendment.”79 Even though “Congress

72

See Id. at 172-173.
Id. at 173.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 169.
76
Id. at 170.
77
Id. at 176.
78
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 62-63.
79
Siegel, supra note 57, at 335.
73
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initially appeared receptive to the Amendment, [] the movement did not secure its ratification for
another three decades.”80
Muller v. Oregon (1908).81 Thirty-three years after the decision in Happersett, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), a labor case. As was the case in
Muller, “a number of laws effectively excluded women from traditionally male jobs.”82 The
appellant in the case, the owner of a laundry, was criminally cited for allowing female employees
to work longer than was permitted under an Oregon state statute.83 The laundry owner argued
that the law that restricted the hours of labor allowable by females violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.84 “[I]n the name of ‘protecting’ [][women] from supposedly sexspecific harms[,]” laws were enacted and upheld that “limit[ed] their hours and time of work, and
[] regulat[ed] other conditions of employment.”85
Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the Court in Muller stating that “[t]he single
question [of the case] is the constitutionality of the statute … as it affects the work of a female in
a laundry.”86 Justice Brewer chose to “put[] to one side the elective franchise[]” for women in his
analysis of the Oregon statute while acknowledging that according to Oregon law a woman’s
“personal and contractual rights [] stand on the same plane as the other sex.”87 This is a quite
progressive stance for the State of Oregon since U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Bradley’s
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concurring opinion in Bradwell, in which he basically said for a married woman to make
contracts “without her husband’s consent”88 was impermissible under “the law of the Creator.”89
Attorneys for the laundry owner in Muller argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment
“th[e] law interfered with [the] constitutional rights of liberty of contract previously established
for men[,]”90 “under the rule of Lochner v. New York.”91 Justice Brewer stated in the Court’s
opinion that it was due to a “woman’s physical structure and the performance of [her] maternal
functions” that warranted the Court’s denial of women’s “general right to contract” that the
Court had previously protected for men in Lochner.92 Justice Brewer stated that the reason the
Court opted to deny women the same rights the Court afforded men was “not merely [due to] her
own health, but the well-being of the race – justify[ing] [the] legislation to protect her from the
greed as well as the passion of man.”93 Justice Brewer states in the opinion that “history
discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man[,]”94 but nowhere in the
opinion is mentioned the legislative history regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923).95 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
another labor case, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the significance
of this case was that it was “the first sex discrimination case to be decided by the Supreme Court
following the adoption of the [Nineteenth] Amendment in 1920.”96 Although this case was
decided through the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and not the
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Fourteenth Amendment, the sex-discrimination jurisprudence established in this case bears
analysis.

Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority in Adkins, referenced the previously

decided Muller case in which the Court had used “the fact that historically woman has always
been dependent upon man,” and that man has “established his control [over woman] by superior
physical strength.”97 Justice Sutherland went on the state:
But the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in
the Muller Case has continued “with diminishing intensity.” In view of the great –
not to say revolutionary – changes which have taken place since that utterance, in
the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth
Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come
almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.98
These words by Justice Sutherland are substantial. Justice Sutherland said that the Court
could no longer “accept the doctrine that women of mature age … may be subjected to
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men
under similar circumstances.”99 Although Justice Sutherland and “[t]he majority in Adkins []
premised [their decision] on the idea that after 1920, sex discrimination was, as a constitutional
matter, a form of caste[,]”100 not every member of the Court was ready to embrace the idea. In
their dissent, “Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Taft both denied that the Nineteenth Amendment
should have any effect on the constitutional analysis.”101 And, with Justice Holmes holding stern
to traditional beliefs of women, he stated in the dissent that “’[i]t will need more than the
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Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women,
or that legislation cannot take those differences into account.’”102
It is not disputed, in the earlier United States Supreme Courts or in the modern Courts, that
Congress regularly “delegate[d] the drafting of statutory text in its chambers, its conferences, and
its committees.”103 These meetings and sessions can be found and used by the Court by accessing
Congress’s legislative history. “The Supreme Court began using legislative history in 1860.”104
The time period of the New Deal legislation in the 1930s and the Supreme Court’s
“overthrow of the “’plain meaning rule’” ushered in “the modern era of fuller, more accurate use
of legislative history.”105 But as we will see, the use of Fourteenth Amendment legislative history
on sex-discrimination cases is remarkably absent.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937).106 In the forty plus years following the ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment and the decision in Adkins, the United States Supreme Court ruled
on three sex-discrimination cases; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), Goesaert v. Cleary
(1948), and Hoyt v. Florida (1961). First, the labor case between Elsie Parrish and her former
employer, West Coast Hotel Company, was heard by the Court in December of 1936 and
decided in March of 1937.107 In the majority opinion, Justice Hughes opined that the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington properly upheld that the State of Washington statute
establishing a minimum wage for women “invoked principles long established by [] [the United
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States Supreme] Court in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.”108 The appellant in the
case, West Coast Hotel Company, “relie[d] upon the decision of th[e] Court in Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, which held invalid the District of Columbia Minimum Wage
Act, which was attacked under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”109 Justice
Hughes stated in the opinion that the State of Washington’s “legislature was entitled” to enact a
statute that addressed “the evils of the “’sweating system,’” [and] the exploiting of workers at
wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living.”110 Justice Hughes went on to
state that the fact that other states in the Union had adopted “similar requirements” as the State of
Washington statute amounted to “a deepseated conviction” nationally to address poverty for
women; and concluded that the “[l]egislative response” by the State of Washington “[could]
[]not be regarded as arbitrary or capricious.”111
Even though it may be accepted today that contemporary labor laws protect the rights of
employees, in the early to mid-1930s the Supreme Court of the United States’ jurisprudence
regarding the right to contract appeared firmly entrenched. This author perceives the majority’s
opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in a patriarchal protectionist stance; as still viewing
women as a class of citizens that needed protection stemming from long held views of women’s
inability to compete with men. Justice Hughes stated that “[w]hat can be closer to the public
interest than the health of women and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching
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employers?”112 A gender-neutral law protecting both men and women from “unscrupulous …
employers” would have been more appropriate.113
As part of the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish dissent, Justice Sutherland forwarded his
views still fresh in his mind from the majority opinion in Adkins.114 With the Lochner doctrine
echoing in his dissent, Justice Sutherland still manages to advocate for the rising tide of the
rights of women and how they are becoming more equal to men.115
Justice Sutherland wrote,
The common-law rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have,
under our system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand upon a
legal and political equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they
should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts;
nor should they be denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for work
paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept.116
Essentially, Justice Sutherland was saying that if women wanted to work for wages that did
not earn them enough money to afford life’s basic necessities alongside of men, consequently,
the Lochner doctrine afforded them that right.117 In principle, Justice Sutherland argued for an
economic equality for women to work in poverty, but it was at least a measure of equality,
nonetheless. Both Justice Hughes and Justice Sutherland cited to previous Supreme Court cases
upholding principles from the Fourteenth Amendment, but neither opinion cited to, or quoted
from, the legislative history of the Amendment itself.
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Goesaert v. Cleary (1948).118 As is the case in life and nature, everything has a retreat of
sorts from time to time. The decision in Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) marks a clear step backwards
regarding the forward progression of United States Supreme Court sex-discrimination
jurisprudence.119 In the majority opinion of an 6-3 decision, Justice Frankfurter stated that the
issue before the Court was whether “Michigan can[] forbid females generally from being
barmaids and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the
owners of liquor establishments.”120 In Justice Frankfurter’s rational analysis of the case through
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he states that the “Constitution in
enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as
between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law[,]”121 but he adds the caveat that
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots.”122
Justice Frankfurter writes in the Goesaert v. Cleary majority opinion that “despite the vast
changes in the social and legal position of women … [t]he Constitution does not require [State]
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards” and, additionally, States
have the right to “draw[] a sharp line between the sexes.”123 Justice Frankfurter and the majority
sided with the State of Michigan’s patriarchal belief “that the oversight assured through
ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a
barmaid without such protecting oversight.”124
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Alternatively, Justice Rutledge’s sharp, but concise, dissent begins with the statement that
“the equal protection clause ... require[s] lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions.”125
Justice Rutledge goes on to write that although “[a] male owner” may be “absent from his bar,
[he] may employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. [But] [a] female owner may neither work as
a barmaid herself nor employ her daughter in that position.”126 In language that will be echoed in
Reed v. Reed some 23 years later, Justice Rutledge stated,
[T]here could be no [] conceivable justification for … [a] statute [that] arbitrarily
discriminates between male and female [bar] owners … [due to] a legislative
solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of women, but for the law, would
be employed as barmaids.127
Although Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge chose to not cite to any Fourteenth
Amendment legislative history within the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in Goesaert v.
Cleary, the Supreme Court had used legislative history in rendering its Court decisions in the
relatively recent past. Use of legislative history became increasingly necessary by the Court due
to “changes in the nature of statutes” brought on “by New Deal legislation.”128 “For example, in
1941, the Supreme Court made use of legislative history to interpret the word “’hire’” under the
National Labor Relations Act.”129 Later, in 1944, “the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
“’public utility’” as used in the Emergency Price Control Act in part by relying on House
committee hearings.”130 Although it is difficult to predict an alternate outcome in every case, it is
the contention of this author that had the Supreme Court of the United States used the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment when conducting its analyses of sex-discrimination cases,
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the intent of at least some of the framers to extend to women the plethora of rights found within
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, along with new meaning to the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses, would have been recognized and taken more into consideration as part of the
Court’s decision making process.
Hoyt v. Florida (1961).131 In 1961, the Court rendered its decision in Hoyt v. Florida.132
Justice Harlan submitted the unanimous opinion for the Court that considered whether Mrs.
Gwendolyn Hoyt’s second degree murder “trial before an all-male jury violated rights assured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”133 Mrs. Hoyt’s claim stated that the all-male jury selected for her
second degree murder trial was an unconstitutional “product of a state jury statute which works
[to the] … exclusion of women from jury service.”134 Justice Harlan started the opinion by first
addressing the challenge that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.135
Justice Harlan wrote,
We of course recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches not only arbitrary
class exclusions from jury service based on race or color, but also all other
exclusions which “single out” any class of persons “for different treatment not
based on some reasonable classification.136
Justice Harlan chose to focus the Court’s rational basis opinion hinging on whether the
exemption of women from registering for jury duty amounted to an “exclusionary device.”137
Justice Harlan stated that “the relevant inquiry is whether the exemption itself is based on some
reasonable classification and whether the manner in which it is exercisable rests on some rational
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foundation.”138 Justice Harlan and the unanimous Court ruled that the statute did rest on a
rational basis.139 Justice Harlan wrote that the State of Florida statute was “acting in pursuit of
the general welfare” and that due to a woman’s “own special responsibilities[,]” she “should be
relieved from the civic duty of jury service” unless “she herself determines” otherwise.140 The
“special responsibilities” that Justice Harlan wrote about were due to the fact the Court opined
that a “woman is still regarded as the center of [the] home and family life.”141 This finding by the
Court in 1961 was in spite of “the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and
protections of bygone years.”142
Justice Harlan, in the Hoyt opinion for the Court, wrote that the instant “case in no way
resemble[d] those [cases] involving race or color” and that “neither the unfortunate atmosphere
of ethnic or racial prejudices … nor the long course of discriminatory administrative practice[s]”
were present.143 This author believes that the Court used language in the Hoyt opinion like
“enlightened emancipation of women”144 specifically due to the nearly 100 years of Supreme
Court sanctioned “discriminatory administrative practice[s].”145 As has been the case to this
point in the establishment of sex-discrimination jurisprudence by the Court, Justice Harlan did
not use legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in the opinion.
Throughout the decade between the Court’s decision in Hoyt and the decision in Reed v.
Reed, the challenge “was essentially to get the Court to see the problem[]” with sex-
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discrimination.146 The Warren Court of the 1960s “steadfastly refused applications to review a
number of cases in which state and lower federal courts had upheld official discrimination
against women.”147 National Organization of Women attorney Mary Eastwood, in 1967,
“advised her organization that pursuing constitutional change through both lawmaking and
adjudication might serve … the movement and strengthen its case.”148 Speaking about the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Constitution, Ms. Eastwood said,
Even if the ERA fails to pass, vigorously pushing for it now will show women are
demanding equal rights and responsibilities under the law by the most drastic
legal means possible – a constitutional amendment. The effect, provided we make
clear we think [the] 14th [amendment] properly interpreted should give women
[the] same unqualified protection, would be to improve our chances of winning
the 14th amendment cases.149
Modern Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence has been established through
using an analogous doctrine to race-discrimination.150 By using “the concept of the
“’stereotype’” that the civil rights movement” employed during the 1960s, feminists “explain[ed]
why laws distinguishing between men and women did not rationally reflect differences in the
family roles[,]” like those cited in the decision in Hoyt, “but instead inflicted constitutionally
cognizable harm on “’individuals.’”151 Future Supreme Court Justice, Professor Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, then a “young law professor[,] [was] chosen by the ACLU” to write the brief for the
appellant in Reed v. Reed.152 In her brief, Professor Ginsburg “honed the race/sex analogy into an
146
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argument for applying to sex-based state action the same strict scrutiny the Court had recently
begun to apply to race-based state action.”153 “Notwithstanding the power of the civil rights
movement in the 1960s, there were important differences between race and sex classifications –
points of disanalogy that haunt sex discrimination law to this day.”154 Still, the continued
effectiveness of current sex-discrimination jurisprudence relies on “the race/gender analogy to
deflect attention from” the fallacies regarding the legislative “history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”155
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Cases decided during the Chief Justice Warren Burger Court

Burger Court Cases from 1971 – 1980
Reed v. Reed (1971).156 In its landmark sex-discrimination decision in Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), the United States Supreme Court ruled for the first time that, under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, States could not enact legislation that placed a
“mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other.”157 The Court did
acknowledge “that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways;”158 but the distinction the Court found in Reed was
that the Equal Protection Clause did not afford a State the right to “legislate [] different
treatment … [of] persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute.”159
As part of its Reed decision, the Court cited to a 1920 United States Supreme Court
decision, Royster v. Virginia, 253 US 412 (1920), which gave rise to the rational basis language,
when the Court said “a classification “‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground or difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”160 The Court in Reed, for the
first time in United States Supreme Court history, ruled a statute unconstitutional through the
application of a rational basis test for sex-discrimination stating that the differences between
males and females in the United States of America did not cause them to be dissimilarly
156
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circumstanced for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unfortunately, the Court in Reed did not seek to undo past sex-discrimination jurisprudence by
identifying any particular cases to overturn, nor did the Reed Court cite to any Fourteenth
Amendment legislative history in its reasoning.161
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, a flurry of 19 cases regarding sexdiscrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were heard by the Court in the seven
years up to and including 1980. This is significant because the Court was only willing to hear a
total of seven cases from 1873 – 1971, a span of almost 100 years. Although our focus in this
thesis is on Fourteenth Amendment cases, some notable Fifth Amendment cases will also be
covered.
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973).162 The case of Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973,
was not based on the Fourteenth Amendment due to the fact that the issue stemmed from a
member of the United States Air Force in a suit over family benefits provided by the Air
Force.163 Although this case does not come under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
does arguably represent “the high-water mark in the [Supreme] Court’s treatment of sex
discrimination.”164 Justice Brennan wrote for the four justice plurality opinion of the Court.
Justice Powell delivered a concurring opinion with two other Justices in agreement with his
opinion. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. The appellant, Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero had
sought an increase in “quarters allowances, and housing and medical benefits for her husband …
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on the ground that he was her “‘dependent.’”165 The fringe benefits were established by Congress
“[i]n an effort to attract career personnel through reenlistment.”166 “Although such benefits
would automatically have been granted to the wife of a male member[,]” Mrs. Frontiero’s
“application was denied” because she was forced to prove her husband’s dependency. 167 It was
believed at the time, that because “99% of all the members of the uniformed services [were]
male,” the government stood to realize a “considerable saving of administrative expense and
manpower” by only forcing female service-members to prove their spouses dependency.168
Justice Brennan and Powell ruled in their separate opinions that the Congressional statutes were
discriminatory on the basis of sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.169
What causes this case to stand out at this moment in time was how Justice Brennan, and
the other three justices who joined him, opined that this case should move the classification of
gender to a “suspect” class and have strict scrutiny applied in all future cases.170 For the first time
in the history of the Supreme Court, an opinion admitted that “[t]here can be no doubt that our
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”171 Justice Brennan wrote
that a “[t]raditional[] … attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ … [has] in [] effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage.”172 Justice Brennan went on to point out the concurring opinion in
Bradwell v. Illinois by Justice Bradley as evidence of the “unfortunate history of sex
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discrimination.”173 Referring to Justice Bradley’s Bradwell concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
said,
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout
much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.174
Also for the first time in the history of the United States Supreme Court, an opinion held
that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth.”175 Justice Brennan made note that “over the [previous] decade, Congress ha[d]
itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications[,]”176 and that due to the
increased sensitivity, “Congress itself ha[d] concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious,” and that the “conclusion of a coequal branch of Government”
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significant and an important consideration of the Court in the development of its opinion in the
instant case. Justice Brennan, representing the four members of the plurality opinion, held that
“classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.” 178 Oddly
enough, Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion did refer to “legislative history”

179

from the

Congress of the United States; but, alas, it was from research into the United States Code statutes
dealing with the Armed Forces fringe benefits and not the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
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Sex-discrimination being elevated to strict scrutiny was only one vote away from
becoming the majority opinion in Frontiero, and therefore, the law of the land; and that vote
most likely would have come from Justice Powell. In the three member concurring opinion
written by Justice Powell, the challenged statute was held to be unconstitutional in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but Justice Powell felt it unnecessary to elevate
“classifications based on sex” to strict judicial scrutiny.180 Justice Powell had two reasons for not
raising gender to a suspect class. His first rationale for this decision was a belief that the recent
decision in Reed v. Reed held the sufficient rational support to overturn the challenged statutes
without “add[ing] sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently
suspect.”181 His second rationale was “because he felt that such a statement was more
appropriately left to the Equal Rights Amendment.”182
“The Equal Rights Amendment,” Justice Powell wrote, “which if adopted will resolve the
substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for
ratification by the States.”183 Justice Powell stated that he felt that the “traditional democratic
process” was underway and that he did not want the Court to act “prematurely” in elevating
gender to a suspect class, giving deference and the “appropriate respect for [the] duly prescribed
legislative process.”184 Ultimately, the Equal Rights Amendment as of yet has not been ratified
by the States, and an opportunity was missed when “the book was closed on the Powell opinion
as a statement against strict scrutiny for gender.”185 “[U]niformly accepted gender classifications
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such as single-sex bathrooms[] … and locker rooms[,]” along with a “fear of military draft on
women” ultimately “led to the defeat of the ERA.”186 Perhaps if Justice Brennan had “articulated
a [strict scrutiny] standard that required [a more] meaningful judicial review of means and
ends[,]”187 his opinion in Frontiero would have garnered more support within the Court.
Kahn v. Shevin (1974).188 With the opinion from Frontiero fresh in the minds of the
Court, the next case to be heard was Kahn v. Shevin in 1974; Justice Douglas delivered the
majority opinion for the Court.189 Mr. Kahn, a widower and a citizen of Florida, had brought suit
against the State of Florida because he believed widowers should be entitled to the same $500.00
tax exemption as widows are afforded, and that his denial by the Dade County Tax Assessor’s
Office was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.190
In his opinion, Justice Douglas wrote that “[t]here can be no dispute that the financial
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the
man.”191 Justice Douglas did acknowledge the struggles facing women in America at the time by
stating that “[w]hether from overt discrimination” in employment stemming from a “maledominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid
jobs.”192 Justice Douglas continued by stating that although a “widower can usually continue in
the occupation” he had prior to his wife’s death, alternatively, “the widow will find herself
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suddenly forced in a[n] [unfamiliar] job market … [and] because of her former economic
dependency [on her deceased husband], she will have fewer skills to offer.”193
In application of his rational basis test, Justice Douglas stated that “Florida’s differing
treatment of widows and widowers “’rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation[,]’” citing to a quote used in Reed from
Royster.194 The State tax law was “reasonably designed[,]” wrote Justice Douglas, in furtherance
of “the state policy of cushioning the financial impact … upon the sex for which th[e] loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.”195 “Gender has never been rejected as an
impermissible classification in all instances[,]” wrote Justice Douglas; and to cap off an almost
complete digression away from the plurality opinion in Frontiero, Justice Douglas chose to end
his opinion by quoting Chief Justice Hughes in the 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon, in which
the Chief Justice stated that the Fourteenth Amendment “imposes no iron rule of equality,
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to schemes of taxation … [and] to hold
otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable
supervision.”196 Although Justice Douglas quoted and cited to sex-discrimination cases like Reed
and Muller, he did not cite to, nor did he quote from, legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Obviously frustrated with the decision from Justice Douglas and the majority, Justice
Brennan’s dissent rails against “a legislative classification that distinguishes potential
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beneficiaries solely by reference to their gender-based status.”197 As in Frontiero, Justice
Brennan argues that a “close judicial scrutiny” is warranted for “gender-based classifications
[that] too often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless
segments of society.”198 Justice Brennan’s vehement insistence that there are “readily available”
gender-neutral or narrowly tailored alternatives at the disposal of the State of Florida
unfortunately fell on the deaf ears of the majority.”199 As was the case in Frontiero, Justice
Brennan did not use Fourteenth Amendment legislative history to make his case for invalidating
the constitutionally challenged Florida statute.
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974).200 During the same 1974 Supreme Court session that had heard
Kahn v. Shevin, the case of Geduldig v. Aiello was decided. This time, Justice Stewart wrote the
opinion for the majority.201 The case was brought by four California women who believed that
the State of California mandated “disability insurance system” that “exclude[d] from coverage
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy … violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”202 As part of his rational analysis of the California employment
disability insurance program, Justice Stewart acknowledged that “California [] created a program
to insure most risks of employment disability, it has not chosen to insure all such risks.”203
Justice Stewart continued by insisting that “[t]his Court has held that, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause, a State may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the problem …
select[ing] one phase of one field and apply[ing] a remedy there, [while] neglecting the others
197
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…”204 And he added that “’[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’” 205 In
upholding the program and holding the women’s contention invalid, Justice Stewart wrote that
“although [the appellee] has received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other
participating employees,” the appellee invalidly feels that she “has suffered discrimination
because she encountered a risk that was outside the program’s protection.”206 Although Justice
Stewart referred to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment numerous times in
his opinion, he did not refer to recent Supreme Court sex-discrimination cases or legislative
history of the Amendment.
Once again, Justice Brennan delivered a dissenting opinion chastising the majority for not
using a higher standard than a rational basis. Oddly enough, Justice Douglas, the author of the
majority opinion in Kahn v. Shevin, joined him in the dissent with Justice Marshall as well.207
Justice Brennan wrote that due to the fact that the condition of a woman’s pregnancy was used to
exclude coverage, he believe that this amounted to a “dissimilar treatment of men and women,
on the basis of physical characteristic inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitut[ing] sex
discrimination.”208 Justice Brennan voiced his concern with the Court’s backslide away from a
higher standard of review of sex-discrimination issues when he wrote,
[B]y its decision today, the Court appears willing to abandon that higher standard
of review without satisfactorily explaining what differentiates the gender-based
classification employed in this case from those found unconstitutional in Reed and
Frontiero. The Court’s decision threatens to return men and women to a time
when “traditional” equal protection analysis sustained legislative classifications
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that treated differently members of a particular sex solely because of their sex.
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).209
Justice Brennan cited to several Supreme Court sex-discrimination cases in his dissent.
Some to use as examples of what precedent the Court should not use as in the cases of Muller,
Goesaert, and Hoyt210; and what cases Justice Brennan thought the Court should use as in Reed
and Frontiero.211 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan did not include any legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment in his dissent in an attempt to sway the Court to an alternate decision.
Taylor v. Louisiana (1975).212 In 1975 the Court heard the case of Taylor v. Louisiana, a
jury selection case eerily similar to the case in Hoyt. The 8 – 1 decision produced the majority
opinion written by Justice White and the lone dissenting opinion written by Justice Rehnquist.213
The appellant, “Billy J. Taylor,” was convicted for “aggravated kidnaping” 214 by a jury that
contained no women. A State of Louisiana Constitutional provision mandated that “a woman
should not be selected for jury service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her
desire to be subject to jury service.”215 Taylor brought the case to the Supreme Court because he
was “deprived of what he claimed to be his federal constitutional right to “’a fair trial by jury of
a representative segment of the community …,’”216 in violation of “his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right[s].”217
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Justice White began his analysis of the case by writing that the holding in Duncan v.
Louisiana (1968) was part of the background of the case because “the Sixth Amendment’s
provision for jury trial [was] made binding on the States by virtue of [its selective incorporation
into] the Fourteenth Amendment.”218 Justice White stated that it was an “unmistakable import” of
the Supreme Court “that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”219
Remarkably, Justice White referred to the legislative history of the “Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968” in the form of “Committee Reports of both the House and the Senate” in
his argument.220
Justice White wrote that the Court was “persuaded that the fair-cross-section requirement
is violated by the systematic exclusion of women, who in the judicial district involved here
amounted to 53% of the citizens eligible for jury service.”221 In the process of reaching this
conclusion, Justice White wrote “the judgment that women are sufficiently numerous and
distinct from men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth
Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.”222 Justice White next moved to
distinguish the decision the Court made in Hoyt. Justice White wrote that the jury selection
“system” employed in the Hoyt case passed a “sufficiently rational basis” test, but, that
Hoyt “did not involve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community and the prospect of depriving him of that right
if women as a class are systematically excluded. The right to a proper jury cannot
be overcome on merely rational grounds. There must be weightier reasons if a
distinctive class representing 53% of the eligible jurors is for all practical
218
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purposes to be excluded from jury service. No such basis has been tendered
here.223
It is not clear if the “weightier reasons” (or heightened scrutiny) that Justice White was
referring to was meant to cover laws and statutes concerning strictly jury selection, or if laws and
statutes involving the discrimination of women required a “weightier reasons.”224 Regardless of
that quandary, Justice White was crystal clear when he opined that “[i]f it was ever the case that
women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required
to perform jury service, that time has long since passed.”225 To his credit, Justice White did cite
to and quote from the legislative history involving the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968, but unfortunately for our case, he did not refer to legislative history from the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Stanton v. Stanton (1975).226 The Supreme Court reviewed the case between Stanton v.
Stanton in 1975 to decide if it was constitutionally justifiable under the Fourteenth Amendment
for a father to be obligated to pay child support for his daughter until the age of 18 years old,
while his child support obligations to his son do not end until he is 21 years old. 227 The 8 – 1
decision produced the majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun and the lone dissenting
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun wrote that the members of the Court
“find it necessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently
suspect.”228 Justice Blackmun wrote that the Court felt that Reed v. Reed was the “controlling”
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case in this matter and that “[t]he test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between
children warrants the distinction … drawn by the Utah statute. We conclude that it does not.”229
In a noteworthy portion of the opinion, Justice Blackmun writes that; “We therefore
conclude that under any test – compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in
between – [the Utah statute], in the context of child support, does not survive an equal protection
attack.”230 “[O]r something in between”231 rational basis and compelling/strict scrutiny is a not so
subtle code by Justice Blackmun and the Court that there may be a heightened scrutiny that the
Court would be willing to accept regarding gender. The upward movement toward this more
stringent test for sex-discrimination was encouraging for American women, but, Justice
Blackmun and the majority in this opinion still did not refer to, or cite to, legislative history from
the Fourteenth Amendment as part of its decision.
Craig v. Boren (1976).232 In the case Craig v. Boren, Justice Brennan delivered the
opinion for the majority of the Court. Not since the plurality opinion in Frontiero from three
years earlier has Justice Brennan’s name been mentioned as the author of a non-dissenting sexdiscrimination case opinion. This time he had the majority of the Court with him. The case
before the Court involved a pair of Oklahoma statutes. Both statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2%
beer; one prohibited the sale to males under the age of 21, and the second to females under the
age of 18.233 The appellants Craig, a male between the age of 18 and 21 years old, and Whitener,
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a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought a complaint that claimed the “gender-based differential”
in the statutes amounted to an “invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age.”234
Justice Brennan began his analysis of the statutes by reviewing the precedents set in Reed
v. Reed. Justice Brennan wrote “that Reed emphasized that statutory classifications that
distinguish between males and females are “’subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.’”235 Justice Brennan also wrote that “[t]o withstand [a] constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”236 This language “established
intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for sex classifications.”237
Justice Brennan gave Reed v. Reed the credit for “provid[ing] the underpinning” for later
Supreme Court decisions that “invalidated statutes” that employed gender “as an inaccurate
proxy for other, more germane bases of classification.”238 Justice Brennan’s Craig opinion gave
life to words and phrases that would be later echoed in other Supreme Court sex-discrimination
opinions; phrases like “’archaic and overbroad’” generalizations,” and “increasingly outdated
misconceptions concerning the role of females.”239
Although the Court agreed with Oklahoma “that traffic safety was an important
governmental objective,” Justice Brennan and the majority of the Court did not believe that “the
sex classification, based on statistical evidence indicating a greater propensity in males to drive
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while intoxicated, to be substantially related to that objective.”240 Therefore, the Court held that
the Oklahoma “3.2% beer statute invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18-20 years of
age.”241 In a process of ruling that the Twenty-first Amendment argument of the appellee did not
“save the invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]”242 Justice Brennan quoted an unnamed
“commentator [that] remarked[]” about the “history of the Twenty-first Amendment,”243 but no
other history, legislative or otherwise, was mentioned regarding the Fourteenth Amendment in
his opinion in Craig.
It is worth noting that Justice Brennan and the majority in Craig “did not discuss the origin
of its new “’intermediate’” standard.”244 The opinion just continued to “simply cite[] Reed.”245
Although the Court in Reed applied the minimum rationality test, it did so while engaging “in an
analysis and reach[ing] a result far less forgiving than usual under that standard.”246 Therefore,
Justice Brennan used the opinion in Craig to “set[] out in concrete terms the unstated heightened
scrutiny employed in Reed.”247
Orr v. Orr (1979).248 Justice Brennan is once again at center stage as the author of the
majority opinion in Orr v. Orr. In the 1979 decision, the Court heard a case regarding the
constitutionality of male only alimony in a divorce case.249 Justice Brennan said that just because
the “classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it
240
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from scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.250 The Court
applied the intermediate standard of review to the case stating that “’classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.’”251 The Court agreed with Mr. Orr’s views that the “Alabama alimony
statutes [] effectively announc[ed] the State’s preference for an allocation of family
responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role.”252
Justice Brennan and the majority decided that the “[reduction] of the disparity in economic
condition between men and women” was an important governmental objective and that what
remained to be determined was “whether the classification at issue here is “’substantially related
to achievement of those objectives.’”253 In holding the statutes in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court found that the “gender-based distinction [in the Alabama statutes]
[was][] gratuitous[]” and that “it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men and
women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex.”254 Justice Brennan warned that
statutes designed to “compensate” for the “effects of past discrimination must be carefully
tailored[,]” as not to fall into the “inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the “’proper
place’” of women and their need for special protection.”255 Once again, Justice Brennan cites to
many previous Supreme Court cases involving sex-discrimination, but he does not cite to or refer
to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in the majority opinion of the Court.
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Parham v. Hughes (1979).256 In the unfortunate case of Parham v. Hughes, the Court was
split into two plurality opinions with Justice Powell concurring with the prevailing group of
justices led by Justice Stewart. No real precedent was set with this case as there was no five
justice majority opinion, although the Georgia statute was upheld.257 The case was brought by an
appellant whose illegitimate child and birth mother were killed in a car accident. 258 A Georgia
statute made it impossible by law for the father of an illegitimate child to recover for the
wrongful death of that child; alternatively, the mother of an illegitimate child could recover.259
Justice Stewart, writing for the prevailing plurality opinion, stated that “[i]n the absence of
invidious discrimination [] a court is not free under the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause to
substitute its judgment for the will of the people of a State as expressed in the laws passed by
their popularly elected legislatures.”260 Meaning that unless there is a legitimate discrimination
calling for a heightened review of a State statute, a rational basis test must be used which gives
great deference to the duly elected legislators who created the law. Justice Stewart and three
other justices did not see an invidious discrimination involving the statute; what they saw was a
statute that differentiated between fathers of legitimate children and fathers of illegitimate
children.261 This circumstance, as Justice Stewart saw it, warranted a rational analysis.262
Justice White, writing for the other non-prevailing plurality justices in their dissent, saw it
a different way.263 Justice White saw it as a “particular discrimination in this case [that] is but
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part of the pervasive sex discrimination in the statute conferring the right to sue for the wrongful
death of a child.”264 Justice White wrote that because the “[a]ppellant is the father, rather than the
mother, of a deceased illegitimate child[]” it is that “reason alone he may not bring an action for
the wrongful death of his child.”265 Justice White accused the prevailing plurality of a “startling
circularity” to their argument, but to no avail.266 Neither plurality opinions, nor the concurring
opinion, cited to or referred to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in their
arguments.
Caban v. Mohammed (1979).267 The case of Caban v. Mohammed was heard by the
Supreme Court in 1979 as a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a New York statute that gave
unwed mothers veto rights on their natural children’s adoption but did not afford those same
rights to unwed fathers of the same children, basing the distinction solely upon gender.268 In this
case, Abdiel Caban’s two “natural children were adopted by their natural mother and stepfather
without his consent.”269 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the five justice majority and used
the intermediate standard of review for this case.270
As part of its analysis, Justice Powell and the majority looked into the legislative history of
the New York statute for guidance in reviewing the State’s argument that it’s important
governmental interest was “in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children.”271 Justice Powell
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wrote that the history behind the statute was “sparse”272 but agreed with New York that the
“State’s interest in providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important one.”273
But Justice Powell did not agree with New York that “the distinction in [the statute] between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers … [provided] a substantial relation to the State’s
interest.”274 Justice Powell wrote in closing that “we believe that [the New York statute] is
another example of “’overbroad generalizations’” in gender-based classifications.”275 Other than
Justice Powell and the majority’s research into the legislative history behind the New York
statute in controversy, which is refreshing to report, no other legislative history was mentioned
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979).276 The year 1979 was a busy
one for sex-discrimination cases heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. Next on
our list is the case Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.277 The seven justice
majority opinion was authored by Justice Stewart.278 Ms. Helen B. Feeney had brought the suit
against the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts in an effort to challenge “the
Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, [] on the ground that it discriminate[d] against
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”279 Ms.
Feeney believed the statute that said that “all veterans who qualify for state civil service
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positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans[] …
operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage of males.”280
Justice Stewart, in keeping with the prevailing precedent, analyzed the case using the
intermediate standard of review.281 As part of that standard, Justice Stewart wrote that “to
withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment … any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public
employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification.”282 This intermediate
scrutiny language would surface again in Mississippi University v. Hogan and United States v.
Virginia some years into the future. The majority held that, after research into the legislative
history of the statute, Ms. Feeney did not prove “that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has,
at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.” 283 Ms.
Feeney argued that the dominant sex in the military leads to a dominance in the number of males
as veterans of the military. 284 In a matter of fact tone, Justice Stewart wrote that “[t]he enlistment
policies of the Armed Services may well have discriminated on the basis of sex[] [but] … the
history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case.”285 In the end,
the majority viewed the statute as having no discriminatory scheme in “a law that by design
…prefers veterans as such[,]” with simply the gender-neutral term veteran carrying the day.286
In the dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, opined that even
though the statute was gender-“neutral in form, the statute [was][] anything but neutral in
280
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application[,]” and that it should be the “burden” of the “State to establish that sex-based
considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme.” 287 Justice
Marshall wrote that the “legislative history of the statute” showed the State of Massachusetts
recognized “the impact the preference system would have on women,” and took steps to
“mitigate that impact only with respect to certain traditionally female occupations.” 288 Justice
Marshall stated that the “statutory scheme … perpetuates … archaic assumptions about women’s
roles” that the Court had previously struck down; and that the majority’s “conclusion to the
contrary … displays a singularly myopic view of the facts.”289 In this case, both sides of the
decision used legislative history in the process of rendering its opinions, but neither side chose to
use the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Califano v. Westcott (1979).290 In the case of Califano v. Westcott, two New England
married couples brought what would be a class action suit challenging Section 407 of the Social
Security Act which “provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived
of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such
benefits when the mother becomes unemployed.”291 The couples said that the gender-based
section of the Social Security Act violated their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,292 but Justice Blackmun and the majority analyzed the section against the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.293
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In writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun said that “[f]or mothers who are the primary
providers for their families, and who are unemployed, [the challenged section] is obviously
gender biased, for it deprives them and their families of benefits solely on the basis of their
sex.”294 Justice Blackmun pointed out that in the recent past the Supreme Court of the United
States “has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications … [in which] the statute
“’discriminates against one particular category of family – that in which the female spouse is a
wage earner.’”295 Administrators for the government argued that the challenged section was
designed by Congress to make desertion by fathers more difficult, but after extensive research
into the legislative history of the challenged section by Justice Blackmun and the majority, this
argument was dismissed.296 To that end, Justice Blackmun wrote that “[t]here is no evidence, in
the legislative history or elsewhere, that a father has less incentive to desert in a family where the
mother is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed, than in a family where the father is the
breadwinner and becomes unemployed.”297 Justice Blackmun continued by stating, “Congress,
with an image of the “’traditional family’” in mind, simply assumed that the father would be the
family breadwinner, and that the mother’s employment role, if any, would be secondary.”298
In the application of the intermediate standard of review, Justice Blackmun concluded
“that the gender classification [in the challenged section] is not substantially related to attainment
of any important and valid statutory goals.” Additionally, Justice Blackmun wrote that the
challenged section represented “part of the “’baggage of sexual stereotypes,’” that presumes the
father has the “’primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’” while the mother is
294
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the “’center of the home and family life.’”299 Justice Blackmun warned that any “[l]egislation
that rest[ed] on such presumptions, without more, [could not][] survive under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment[;]”300 and presumably under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This opinion by Justice Blackmun appears to show evidence of substantial research by the
Supreme Court of the United States into the legislative history behind Congressional legislation.
Unfortunately for our purposes here, the analysis was under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the dawn of
the 1980s, “opinions from all points on the ideological spectrum cited legislative history freely
and generously.”301 Justices used the legislative history to both “support … the controversial
proposition of how to implement a mix of broad congressional purposes absent specific intent,”
but just as often to “support [] noncontroversial propositions.”302 As we will see, this sentiment
of free and generous use of legislative history is not reflected in the 1980s sex-discrimination
cases.
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company (1980).303 In the case of Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Insurance Company, the appellant Mr. Wengler, a widower, brought a case
claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which a
provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation laws denied him benefits from his wife’s workrelated death.304 Mr. Wengler claimed it was an invalid provision due to a “gender-based
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discrimination”305 stemming from the provision that would not allow a husband to collect workrelated death benefits unless that husband proved that he was either “incapacitated []or
dependent on his wife’s earnings,” of which the Mr. Wengler was neither.306 The provision did
not have a similar requirement for female beneficiaries.307
Justice White authored the opinion for the seven justice majority and applied the
intermediate standard of review to the analysis of the Missouri statutory provision.308 Justice
White wrote that the challenged provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation law
“indisputably mandates gender-based discrimination[] … [and that] it is apparent that the statute
discriminates against both men and women.”309 Justice White stated that due to the statutory
scheme, “Mrs. Wengler would have been conclusively presumed to be dependent” on Mr.
Wengler in the event of his death, with an automatic “statutory amount for life or until she
remarried.”310 Justice White opined that “this kind of discrimination against working women …
[is] found unjustified.”311 “Accordingly,” wrote Justice White, “we reverse … and remand the
case … for further proceedings.”312 No legislative history, Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise,
was cited to, or referred to, as part of Justice White’s majority opinion.
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Burger Court Cases from 1981 – 1986
Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County (1981).313 In the case of Michael M. (a
minor) v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the justices were split into a four justice plurality
opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, with one concurring opinion by Justices Stewart and one
opinion concurring in the judgment by Justice Blackman; so no substantial constitutional case
law was created from the decision.314 The case was brought by a minor male charged under
California’s statutory rape law that “made[] men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual
intercourse[]” with a female under the age of 18 years. 315 The petitioner Michael M. claimed that
the statute was discriminatorily schemed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.316
Justice Rehnquist recalled in the plurality opinion that the Supreme Court had
“consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification [was] not invidious, but rather
realistically reflect[ed] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances.”317 The plurality justices felt “satisfied” that the State of California had a “strong
interest in [the] preventi[on] [of illegitimate] [] pregnancy” due to the fact that those children
who are born of the “illegitimacy makes them likely candidates to become wards of the State.”318
Justice Rehnquist and the other justices of the plurality ruled that the California statute that
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“directly [] prohibit[ed] a male from having sexual intercourse with a minor female … [was]
sufficiently related to the State’s objective to pass constitutional muster.”319
Unsatisfied with the opinion from Justice Rehnquist and the plurality, Justice Brennan
authored a dissent from the judgment challenging the notion that the California statute could not
be drafted into a gender-neutral form and still remain effective for the States purposes.320 Justice
Brennan wrote that “at least 37 States [] have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws[,]” of
which, the States of “Arizona, Florida, and Illinois permit prosecution of both minor females and
minor males for engaging in mutual sexual conduct.”321 “California has introduced no
evidence[,]” wrote Justice Brennan, “that those States have been handicapped by the
enforcement problems the plurality finds so persuasive.”322 Although a modest review of the
legislative history of the California statute was mentioned by multiple justices in the several
opinions in the case, there was no mention of a review of the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment having been done by any justices involved with this case.
Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981).323 In the case of Kirchberg v. Feenstra, the Court ruled on
whether a “Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as “’head and master’” of property jointly
owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such property without his spouse’s
consent[]” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.324 Authoring
what, except for a modest technicality, would have been a rare unanimous ruling by the Court,
Justice Marshall’s opinion garnered the full support of six justices and a concurring opinion
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which covered the remaining two justices.325 Applying the intermediate standard of review to the
case, Justice Marshall said that,
[b]y granting the husband exclusive control over the disposition of community
property, [the challenged statute] clearly embodies the type of express genderbased discrimination that we have found unconstitutional absent a showing that
the classification is tailored to further an important governmental interest.326
In ruling that the Louisiana statute clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause, Justice
Marshall reminded the losing appellant that the “’absence of an insurmountable barrier’” will not
redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law.”327 Alternatively, Justice Marshall
wrote that “the burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly
discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an “’exceedingly persuasive justification’” for the
challenged classification.”328 In what was a straight-forward and relatively short opinion, Justice
Marshall did not cite to or refer to any legislative history, Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982).329 The case of Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan finds the first woman justice to the Supreme Court of the United States,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, authoring the majority opinion for the Court.330 The issue
presented to the Court for review was “whether a state statute that excludes males from enrolling
in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”331 Justice O’Connor aptly applies the firmly entrenched intermediate
standard of review to the case citing the “burden” of the State in displaying an “’exceedingly
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persuasive justification’” in which the challenged classification serves “’important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’” are “’substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.’”332
For the State of Mississippi, the argument they forwarded to the Court was that
“maintaining the single-sex admissions policy of MUW’s School of Nursing is that it
compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitutes educational affirmative
action[;]” but that argument, the Court found, was “unpersuasive.”333 Justice O’Connor stated in
a footnote that the “State ha[d] failed to establish that the legislature intended the single-sex
policy to compensate for any perceived discrimination.”334 Ultimately, Justice O’Connor and the
majority ruled that “MUW’s policy of denying males the right to enroll for credit in its School of
Nursing violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”335 Although
Justice O’Connor pointed out that the State of Mississippi did not provide proof of the
legislator’s intent with the challenged statute through legislative history of the statute, Justice
O’Connor and the majority did not offer legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment or its
Framers’ intent for expanding women’s rights.
In the absence of legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment to rely on, Justice
O’Connor and the majority relied on a decades-worth of past sex-discrimination Supreme Court
cases, including; Reed v. Reed, Caban v. Mohammed, Orr v. Orr, Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., to just
name those cited in Justice O’Connor’s recounting of the intermediate standard of review for
332
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gender-based discrimination cases.336 Without the need for research into the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the documented evidence that some of the Framers intended to
establish expanded rights for women, the modern Supreme Court has well established Court
decisions lacking in grounding from legislative history to cite to for its sex-discrimination
jurisprudence.
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Cases decided during the Chief Justice William Rehnquist Court

Rehnquist Court Cases from 1986 – 1996
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994).337 In the case of J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. (a
minor child), Justice Blackmun authored the opinion by the narrow majority of the Court
regarding “whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of race.”338 Justice Blackmun and the
majority, requiring an exceedingly persuasive justification through the intermediate standard of
review, held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality.”339 The background of the case involved a complaint for paternity and child support
brought by the State of Alabama.340 For trial, the lower court assembled “36 potential jurors,” to
which the State used “peremptory strikes” as part of the voir dire process to ultimately attain a
jury comprised of only female jurors.341 Before the all-female jury was “empaneled,” the
petitioner voiced his objection to the use of the peremptory challenges “solely on the basis of
gender” by the State “in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”342 The petitioner’s logic was that it was previously ruled in Batson v. Kentucky
that “peremptory strikes solely on the basis of race” in the voir dire process violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that because the Amendment “similarly forbids intentional
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discrimination on the basis of gender[,]” the State action in the instant case should be ruled
unconstitutional as well.343 The Court agreed.
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun set forth to recite the history of sexdiscrimination in the United States starting from the English common law exclusion of women
from juries “under “’the doctrine of propter defectum sexus, literally, the ‘defect of sex[,]’” a
brief stop at Bradwell v. State, up to and through Frontiero v. Richardson; a lengthy testimonial
to say the least.344 Justice Blackmun opined that for the purposes of this case it was not necessary
to determine “whether women or racial minorities have suffered more at the hands of
discriminatory state actors during the decades of our Nation’s history[;]”345 nor was it necessary
for the instant case to decide the “open question” from Justice Ginsburg as to “whether
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect[,]” raising the review of gender-based
classifications to a strict scrutiny standard of review.346
In ruling that the lower court’s decision was reversed and ordered to be remanded back for
further proceedings, Justice Blackmun cautioned that due to the fact that “gender and race are
overlapping categories[]” in the case of minority women, “gender can be used as a pretext for
racial discrimination[] … allowing parties to remove racial minorities from the jury not because
of their race, but because of their gender.”347 This would allow, wrote Justice Blackmun, the
erosion of “well-established equal protection principles and could insulate effectively racial
discrimination from judicial scrutiny.”348
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In J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the majority did not
cite to or refer to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion came extremely close to doing just that.349 Although Justice Kennedy
admitted that he was in “full agreement” with the majority opinion, he felt it necessary to
“explain [his] understanding of why [the Court’s] [] precedents lead to [the] [] conclusion[]” by
the majority.350 Justice Kennedy wrote;
Though in some initial drafts the Fourteenth Amendment was written to prohibit
discrimination against “persons because of race, color or previous condition of
servitude,” the Amendment submitted for consideration and later ratified
contained more comprehensive terms: “No State shall … deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 172-173, 27 L. Ed. 2nd 272, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th Congress, 1865-1867, pp. 90-91,
97-100 (1914).351
Admittedly, the blocked quote from above does not contain any citations from actual
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it does come tantalizingly close.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy cites to a Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on
Reconstruction from the 39th Congress of 1865-1867 by Benjamin B. Kendrick, originally
published in 1914, for his commentary regarding the “initial drafts of the Fourteenth
Amendment” and the Amendment’s eventually ratified “comprehensive terms.”352 Justice
Kennedy curiously chose to reference the 1914 publication, even though actual transcripts from
the 1865-1867 39th Congressional committee meetings were readily available to the Supreme
Court justices, and the entire populous of this country for that matter, through the archives of the
349
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library of Congress. The specific reasons for Justice Kennedy’s use of Mr. Kendrick’s
publication rather than actual transcripts from the archives are not readily available to this author
for use as part of this thesis.
As Justice Kennedy continued to opine his “understanding of why [the Court’s] []
precedents lead to [the] [] conclusion[]”353 by the majority in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B.,
Justice Kennedy wrote that due to the fact that there was “the necessity for the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920,” too much time that had passed “before the Equal Protection Clause was
thought to reach beyond the purpose of prohibiting racial discrimination and to apply as well to
discrimination based on sex.”354 Justice Kennedy wrote that the Supreme Court had “subjected
governmental classifications based on sex to heightened scrutiny[] … [i]n over 20 cases
beginning in 1971,” and that the “case law [] reveal[ed] a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid.”355
Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause and our constitutional tradition”
are grounded in the concept that “individual [] rights [] are protected against lawless action by
the government.”356 “The neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause,” wrote Justice
Kennedy, in extending its protections to “’any person,’” reveals its concern with the rights of
individuals.”357 Concluding his understanding, Justice Kennedy stated that it was the “neutrality”
in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to equal protection from the law that
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was “confirmed by the fact that the Court ha[d] no difficulty in finding a constitutional wrong in
this [gender-based] case.”358
United States v. Virginia (1996).359 In what should only be described as the universe
coming around full circle, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia, a quarter century after arguing on the side of Sally Reed in
1971, and as an ACLU lead attorney, arguing on a majority of the cases that compile the sexdiscrimination jurisprudence we see today.360 The U.S. v. Virginia case started in 1990,
“prompted by a complaint filed … by a female high-school student seeking admission to VMI,
… alleging that VMI’s exclusively male admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”361 Justice Ginsburg once again applied the intermediate standard
of review to the case ruling that VMI and the State of Virginia “ha[d] shown no “’exceedingly
persuasive justification’” for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by
VMI.”362
In the process of explaining how the majority developed its decision in the case, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that the Court’s “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.”363 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged
that for over 130 years of history of the United States, “women did not count among voters
composing “’We the People.’”364 And in recalling the decision in Reed, Justice Ginsburg wrote
that “[i]n 1971, for the first time in our Nation’s history, this Court ruled in favor of a woman
358

Id. at 153.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
360
See Id. at 519.
361
Id. at 523.
362
Id. at 534.
363
Id. at 531.
364
Id.
359

61

who complained that her State had denied her the equal protection of its laws.”365 The history
continued from cases including Reed v. Reed, to Kirchberg v. Feenstra, through Stanton v.
Stanton.”366 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Supreme Court “carefully inspected official action
… that denie[d] opportunities to women (or to men) … in post-Reed decisions … [w]ithout
equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national
origin.”367 While it is true that Justice Ginsburg cited to a majority of the cases that make up the
modern sex-discrimination jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, she did not cite to or refer to the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment as proof that it was used as part of the Court’s
decision making process in ruling in United States v. Virginia.
The majority’s decision in the VMI case appeared to reinforced the concept that future
controversies regarding gender-based discrimination, for the most part, will be viewed with a
heightened scrutiny, but what that elevated scrutiny actually means was the cause for much
debate by dissenter Justice Scalia and concurring dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist.368 The use of
the phrase “’exceedingly persuasive justification’” numerous times by Justice Ginsburg in the
majority opinion in the VMI case “provoked a bitter dissent from Justice Scalia, who essentially
accused the majority of abandoning intermediate for strict scrutiny on the sly.”369 In his opinion
concurring in Justice Scalia’s dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “terms like “’important
governmental objective’” and “’substantially related’” are hardly models of precision, [but] they
have more content and specificity than does the phrase “’exceedingly persuasive
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justification.’”370 Chief Justice Rehnquist felt like “[t]hat phrase is best confined, as it was first
used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of
the test itself.”371 Additionally, Justice Scalia forwarded the contention that the “decision ignored
history, … but he did not seriously attempt to conduct [his own] [] inquiry.”372
Legislative History: Justice Breyer and Inquiries into Congressional Intent. As has
been the case for hundreds of years, “[t]he language of a statute may admittedly be vague,” and
judges who are attempting to construe the meaning of terms from an enacted statute (or
Amendment) “’cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools (such as legislative history) which
members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of the
words used in the statute.’”373 Current Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer believes that
legislative history is “an essential channel of communication between those who create the law
and those who interpret and enforce it.”374 Some are concerned that due to the Supreme Courts’
doctrine based on a “bifurcated framework of review[,]” there is little “dialog between the courts
and the political branches about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]” which “grants
Congress the power to enforce the amendment’s provisions by appropriate legislation.” 375 But
Justice Breyer insists that preserving “the use of legislative history serves one of the most
important goals of our legal system – creating and maintaining laws “’consistent with the
reasonable expectations of those who live within it.”376
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As the former Chief Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Breyer possesses
a unique perspective regarding legislative history.377 As examples of other organizations that
function similarly to Congress’s “’group mind’” regarding “collective intent[,]” Justice Breyer
cites – “law school faculty setting tuition levels, a basketball team making a play, and a tank
corps implementing a battle plan” – groups that are all enthralled in a “coordinated action with a
collective intent, though the individuals may not have identical subjective awareness.”378
Similarly, Congress with its “bureaucratic organization” working through “committees actively
engaged … [in] generating legislation[,]” lawmakers occupy roles in which they participate via
“supervising and handling active discussions on the controversial subjects of proposed bills,” all
while the “legislative history [is being] record[ed] [regarding] the details of real choices and
decisions.”379
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Conclusion
“Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has never sought to ascertain the historical meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment for sex discrimination.”380 What that statement says is that there is
140 years of sex-discrimination jurisprudence based upon the Fourteenth Amendment without
even a trace of information included in Supreme Court opinions regarding indications of what
the actual intent of the Framers of the Amendment could have been. This thesis has established
the concept that throughout the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, legislative
history has been used at least from time to time in the process of adjudicating cases. So then,
why is there a complete absence of legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment regarding
sex-discrimination from Supreme Court opinions?
“The Constitution’s text alone is evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad
scope.”381 “The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were free to use language that was either
broad or narrow[,]”382 but the Framers chose to use broad and ambiguous language. If a statute or
Amendment has language that is vague or ambiguous, Supreme Court justices throughout the
decades have turned to legislative history to ascertain the meaning the Framers of the legislation
intended it to mean. But the Court’s legislative history research is non-existent related to sexdiscrimination and women’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This author is not
contending that all it would have taken was for Justice Bradley in 1873 to look into committee
transcripts from the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and he would have decided to
let Mrs. Bradwell become an attorney; but maybe it would not have taken almost 100 years
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before the highest court in the land held that a State had violated the rights of women under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the modern era, United States Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence has been
established through a rereading of the Fourteenth Amendment, although, the current
interpretation only “prevent[s] certain kinds of discrimination based on sex.”383 The question
regarding if gender should be considered to be analogous with race or if female rights should be
stand alone may be better answered via a look into the legislative history regarding what the
Framers intended. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment could provide support
for or against what is perceived as the ultimate congressional purposes for the Amendment.
Regardless, the history should be accessed. One argument is that the “Fourteenth Amendment’s
meaning … was designed to be applied to [] facts as we [see] … them today, not as people
understood [them] [150] years ago.”384 But the only way to know for sure is for the Supreme
Court to research the Fourteenth Amendment legislative history relating to women and gender
and use that information as part of an opinion. If the Framers intended us to view the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment specifically as it was known as in the 19th century, the Amendment
would have “call[ed] on subsequent generations to apply it based on misinformation prevalent in
1868.”385
For certain, the Framers “could have explicitly excluded women from Section One’s
protections, but they did not do so.”386 Due to the absence of research into the legislative history
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the documented evidence that some of the Framers intended to
383
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establish expanded rights for women, the modern Supreme Court has well established Court
decisions lacking in grounding from legislative history, and will continue to lack, as the Court
crafts its future sex-discrimination jurisprudence.
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